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Epistemology of the Self in a
Pragmatic Mood
Rosa M. Calcaterra
1 One of the most characteristic features of classical pragmatism is the opposition to the
Cartesian  principle  of  self-transparency,  a  principle  which  in  fact  has  been  widely
criticized also by Marx, Freud and a number of twentieth century’s philosophers. Thus,
the notion of the authenticity of the self seems nowadays almost unsustainable, and the so
called ‘dissolution of the subject’ – brought about by in the second half of last century –
might be considered as a corollary of this criticism of Cartesian epistemology of the self.
However, a reflection on the notion of authenticity, based on the rich store of critical
knowledge now available to us, is perhaps very important in order to clarify the basic
structure of that relationship to one’s self through which, in concrete experience, one
constructs  self-understanding  and  the  image  of  oneself  to  offer  to  others.  In  the
following,  I  address  this  possibility  and  show  that  the  overcoming  of  the  Cartesian
perspective  on  the  theme  of  personal  identity  is  not  necessarily  equivalent  to  the
‘dissolution of the subject.’ In this light, I will present a few remarks about contemporary
approaches to the epistemology of the self, in order to point out the lively presence of
some distinctive features of pragmatism in current philosophical debates on the issue. In
particular:
1)  The  externalist  methodology,  i.e.  the  overcoming  of  introspection  as  a  primary
criterion for the access to the so-called ‘inner world’ and, consequently, the pragmatist
restructuring of the conceptual couple inner/outer.
2) The critique of the essentialist notion of the subject/consciousness and the alternative
conception of subjectivity as dynamic, plastic, and – finally – a socio-historical reality.
3) The positive emphasis on language as an epistemic dimension, that is, the importance
assigned to communicative practices as pivotal activities for every type of knowledge.
4)  The interweaving of  subjectivity and normativity,  namely,  the acknowledgment of
normativity as a distinctive feature of the human mind.
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2 The theme of subjectivity involves a network of concepts/questions: personal identity-
self awareness, knowledge of ‘other minds’ or inter-individual recognition; and numerous
conceptual couples that are severely compromised by our long history of ideas: internal/
external,  subjective/objective,  essence/appearance,  mind/language,  normative/
descriptive, just to give a few rapid examples. It is a theme that is rarely addressed in the
classics  of  pragmatism,  with  the  exception  of  James  and  Mead,1 but  today  it  is  a
particularly urgent subject for reflection, for the well known historical-cultural reasons
that affect us closely:  globalization, intercultural conflicts,  ethical relativism, etc.  The
theme of subjectivity thus bears witness to the priority of history over philosophy: the
‘truth’ of the Hegelian assertion according to which philosophy is the activity of leading
history to the concept. But, above all, and this is what interests me particularly, it is a
theme that – in my opinion – indicates how ephemeral, shifting, if not even – for certain
aspects  –  incongruous,  the boundaries  are that  one tends to erect  between different
philosophical  sectors,  in  this  case  between  the  theoretical-epistemological  area  of
philosophical research and the area of practical philosophy.
3 In  this  observation  I  already  make  use,  clearly,  of  a  pragmatist  point  of  view:  no
dichotomies, and in particular no sharp separation between facts and values, between
science and ethics. However, I also make use of Peirce’s doctrine about the normative
sciences, his theory of the interweaving of logic, ethics and esthetics – keeping in mind
that for Peirce, as is well known, the term ‘logic’ concerns thought in its great complexity
and not only the purely ‘technical’ level of the various forms of reasoning.
4 Based on Peirce’s Philosophy and the Conduct of Life (Peirce 1998: 105-22), which is in my
opinion preparatory to the famous writing by Peirce on the normative sciences, I have
already had the opportunity to indicate that the esthetic level of subjectivity, the so-
called  affective  sphere  of  the  human  being,  which  is  usually  understood  to  be
heterogeneous to the rational sphere, is instead an integral aspect of it.2 In addition, it is
necessary – from Peirce’s point of view – to include sentiments and subjective emotions
among the objects of reflection and reasoning, that is to say, to restore them to the “space
of reasons”: to that fundamental activity of the human being that consists in giving and
asking for justifications for everything that concerns us, thus also for our affective habits
and for  the  consequential  behavioral  attitudes.  This  does  not  mean to  minimize  the
difference  between  the  rational  level  and  the  esthetic/affective  level,  but  rather  to
translate it into an articulated, dynamic and, in a word, public conception of rationality.
Such a conception thus includes, as a central aspect, the conviction that sentiments can
be said to be ‘truly’ human precisely in as much as each one of us tends ‘normally’ to
comprehend them and explain them according to an order of sense and of meaning that
is inter-subjectively recognizable.
5 According to most interpretations of Philosophy and the Conduct of Life, it exhibits Peirce’s
support of science rather than of scientism. There is, in fact, a precise delimitation of the
effectiveness  of  scientific  research:  for  Peirce,  science  is  essentially  a  method  of
reasoning, the most subtle method for obtaining new information about the objective
world, but nevertheless it cannot be considered as the best tool humans can employ in
order to solve “vitally important topics.” In this very delicate area – Peirce declares – we
should rather rely upon instinct and feeling, that is on the most immediate intuitions of
human beings. These are rooted in human biology and, thus, are constitutive ingredients
of human performance. Nicholas Rescher gives an interesting expression to this point of
view: as he says, even though Peirce had always stressed the value of science as a ‘social
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process’ determined by cognitive and practical interactions, in this paper he intended to
show that emotional capacities, i.e. the capacity for love or sympathy, are in reality not
less important than the capacity for knowledge. According to Rescher, finally Peirce’s
suggestion would be that human life is too important to be entrusted to science.3
6 However,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  infer  from  this  suggestion  that  Peirce  is  simply
maintaining  the  need  to  disconnect  science  and  ethics  on  the  basis  of  the  sharp
distinction that Hume espoused between reasoning, on one hand, and feelings, on the
other. Rather,  Peirce’s concluding arguments hints at his sinechism,  a principle which
leaves  no  room  for  a  substantial  contraposition  between  the  accomplishments  of
rationality and those of feeling.
7 But there is a major point in Philosophy and the Conduct of Life that challenges the notion,
derived from Hume, that there is a substantial difference between science and ethics. As I
mentioned  earlier,  this  paradigm  appears  ruled  out  by  passages  emphasizing  the
cognitive importance of sentiment and hereditary instinct as well as the possibility of an
aesthetic  dimension  in  the  normative  space  of  rationality.  This  line  of  thought  is
expressed in the context of Peirce’s claim that matters of “vital importance” must be left
to sentiments and instinct, by the following comment:
There are two conceivable ways in which right sentiment might treat such terrible
crises; on the one hand, it might be that while human instincts are not so detailed
and emphasized as those of the dumb animals yet they might be sufficient to guide
us in the greatest concerns without any aid from reason, while on the other hand,
sentiment might act  to bring the vital  crises under the control  of  reasoning by
rising to such a height of self abnegation as to render the situation insignificant. In
point of fact,  we observe that a healthy natural human nature does act in both
ways. (Peirce 1898: 112-3)
8 Such a perspective is not in contrast with Peirce’s claim that pure scientific research per
se has nothing to do with the criterion of practical utility (Peirce 1898: 107).4 In fact, the
formerly  quoted  assertion  does  not  relate  to  this  particular  kind  of  theoretical
investigation, but to the impact that rationality, as reflective and ‘social’ activity, may
have on the affective dynamics that normally lead us in our most problematic situations.
Consequently, the concluding passage of his discourse points out the positive value of
that peculiar sort of human experience we can define as the cognitive experience of feelings,
namely a reflective experience on our sentiments and emotions which,  by definition,
exceeds  the  pre-logical  character  of  affective  dimension.  Let me cite  this  passage at
length:
Here we are in this workaday world, little creatures, mere cells in a social organism
itself poor and little thing enough, and we must look to see what little and definite
task circumstances we have set before our little strength to do. The performance of
that task will require us to draw upon that department of the soul which is the most
superficial and fallible – I mean our reason –, but upon that department that is deep
and sure – which is instinct. Instinct is capable of development and growth – though by
a movement which is slow in the proportion in which it is vital; and this development
takes place upon lines which are parallel to those of reasoning. And just as reasoning arises
from experience, so the development of sentiment arises from the soul’s Inward and Outward
Experiences (such as meditation, on the one hand, and adversity on the other). Not only is it
of the same nature as the development of cognition, but it chiefly takes place through the
instrumentality of cognition. The soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface
. (Peirce 1898: 121-2; my italics)
9 As we have previously seen, cognition is a product of rationality, which, in Peirce’s view,
is a web of empirical factors and logical norms. However, a crucial aspect of his semiotic
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theory of logic is that rationality’s normative aspect essentially consists in the possibility
of  transferring empirical  data  to  the  dimension of  logical  signs  or  concepts,  namely
representations of socially sharable meanings, and, correspondingly, in the possibility of
providing theoretic and behavioral attitudes whose justification transcends the dynamics
of  mere experiential  facts,  including those bringing about the ‘natural’  selection and
consolidation of some particular human habits.  The above quoted assertion that “the
development of sentiment arises from the soul’s Inward and Outward Experiences” is just
an allusion to the normative character of rationality. In any case, what Peirce is pointing
out is that even the most deep-rooted human habits are not independent of the regulative
power of rational activity. On the contrary, he is confident that philosophy and other
sciences “will by low percolation gradually reach the very core of one’s being, and will
come to influence our lives; and this they will do, not because they involve truths of
merely vital importance, but because they are ideal and eternal verities” (ibid.).
10 To have confidence in such a possibility certainly does not mean proposing once again
the ancient parallelism of ethics and philosophical/scientific knowledge. In the paper we
are considering,  there is indeed a firm rejection of “the Hellenic tendency to mingle
Philosophy and Practice.” However, in the light of Peirce’s remarks about what I defined
as cognitive experience of feelings,  we may draw the conclusion that he is suggesting an
attractive revision of the science/ethics dichotomy deriving from the Humean ‘is-ought
question.’ As I noted earlier, the revision consists in a conceptual strategy that tends to
replace the idea that science and ethics belong to different ontological domains with the
description  of  their  formal  and  functional  difference.  Of  course,  the  statement  of  a
difference is something else than the statement of a dichotomy, as Peirce’s stress on the
continuum of philosophical-scientific reasoning with the affective sphere demonstrates.
And,  in my opinion,  the intuition that  lies  behind this  argument is  compelling.  It  is
concerned, indeed,  with the strong evidence that,  after all,  our sentiments are really
‘human’  just  as  far  as  we  are  ‘normally’  inclined  to  justify  the  validity  of  our  own
esthetical attitudes by means of a capacity that characterizes us as rational beings, i.e. by
means of grasping socially shareable horizons of sense and truth.
11 In the following, I  intend to offer an indication of the need to follow the pragmatist
commitment  to  going  beyond another  logical-methodological  opposition,  namely  the
dichotomic formulation of the coupled terms inner/external set out by Descartes. At the
same time,  however,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  set  aside  easy
reductionisms,  which  would  lead  to  losing  sight  of  the  complexity  of  the  theme  of
personal  identity.  In  fact,  if  on  the  one  hand  the  wealth  of  conceptual  tools  and
methodologies perfected by contemporary thought for the elaboration of this theme has
greatly increased our possibility to analyze it thoroughly, on the other hand, precisely
because of this variety of tools, it is necessary to recognize that a univocal definition of
the theme is extremely difficult and improbable.
12 In a purely schematic way, one can say that one of the most characteristic aspects of the
contemporary discussion on the question of  self-awareness consists in the challenges
made against  the dualism between ‘internal’  and ‘external,’  ‘psychic’  or  ‘mental’  and
‘physical,’  which  defines  the  Cartesian  paradigm.  As  an  alternative,  a  good  part  of
twentieth  century  thought  has  tried  to  carry  forward  the  skepticism  expressed  by
traditional  British  empiricism  towards  the  ontological-metaphysical  vocabulary
instituted by Descartes. In this regard favorable reception has been given both to the
theories that attempt to dissolve this vocabulary by reducing the entire field of human
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reality  to  the  neuro-cerebral  processes,  as  well  as  to  the  theoretical  positions  that
challenge the essentialist and ‘centralist’ notion of the human subject, pointing to the
dimensions of language and of sociality in order to exhibit, instead, its plasticity, its basic
relational and dynamic nature: in other words, in order to promote the ‘decentralization’
of the subject.
13 The many efforts made to ‘dissolve’ the Cartesian concept of subjectivity are, however, in
conflict with its effective, constant recurrence in our linguistic practices. In any case, the
image of the human subject as the autonomous center of experience,  knowledge and
action continues to be an important point of reference in the formulation of problems
that  have  substantial  repercussions  at  an  existential  and  socio-cultural  level.  In
particular, these are the question of affective dynamics, the question of liberty and of
moral or legal responsibility, and more in general, the problem of the definition of the
patterns of rationality. In any case, it is a matter of taking into account the ordinary
conception  that  we  have  of  ourselves  and  of  our  peers,  that  is,  our  usual way  of
considering ourselves as entities completely different from every other component of the
physical-natural world surrounding us. This is a conception within which words such as
‘I,’ ‘subject,’ ‘consciousness,’ ‘person,’ ‘mind’ carry out an impressive logical-semantic role
of opposition to physicality, in both the ontological and the functional senses.
14 This scenario appears instead to be seriously disrupted if we turn to areas of discourse
and  of  experience  that  have  made  the  naturalistic  perspective  their  own,  often
radicalizing it. This perspective extends from ancient thought to the neurosciences, via 
British empiricism and Darwinian biology. Since I cannot enter into the detail that would
certainly be called for, I will limit myself to noting that in the perspectives developed
through Darwinian biology the distinction between internal and external tends to be
resolved in favor of exteriority, that is, in terms of an equation mind/brain based on the
use of sophisticated technological instruments which allow, as it were, to externalize the
mental and describe it like any other physical object.
15 I would like to make a brief comment here on the ambiguity of the option in favor of the
descriptive  method which characterizes  the experimental  sciences,  a  method that  in
twentieth century philosophy was intended – as we know – to be an alternative to the
foundationalist  method  of  traditional  thought,  and  first  of  all  an  alternative  to  its
requirements  of  extra-empirical  truths.  In  a  few  words,  it  would  be a  question  of
overturning the idea of ‘foundation’ in favor of that of ‘description,’ assuming the latter,
in principle, to be a sort of antidote to philosophical absolutizations and dogmatisms.
However, if one examines the question closely, the invocation of the descriptive method
often allows one to glimpse a subtle form of dogmatism. This dogmatism proves to be
weaker or stronger according to the degree to which the risks go unnoticed of supporting
the ingenuous aspects of scientism, that is to say, the tendency to mistake knowledge
based on the  analysis  of  ‘empirical  facts’  for  fully  founded certainties  that  are  thus
consolidated once and for all.
16 Because of its role as methodological norm both of science and of philosophy, there is a
risk that the descriptive method can carry within itself a hidden interweaving among
‘description,’  ‘empirical  facts’  and  ‘certainty,’  challenging  the  very  meaning  of  its
opposition to the dogmatisms of foundationalist philosophies. This can happen precisely
because  such  a  method  tends  to  feed  the  definitory  and  essentialist  mentality  of
traditional thought. Wittgenstein’s effort to give the descriptive method a clearly anti-
essentialist statute is particularly important for the theme about which I am speaking,
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just because Wittgenstein tried to show the problematic aspect of the nexus between
‘empirical/descriptive’  and ‘certainty.’5 In a nutshell,  Wittgenstein’s  thesis  is  that the
very idea of ‘certainty’ should be removed from the epistemological area and considered,
instead,  in  terms  of  the  so-called  “systematic  propositions,”  which  constitute  the
“inherited backdrop” against which the events of our areas of knowledge are played out,
but which actually possess a pragmatic foundation and not an empirical justification.6 It
is, in fact, based on this conceptual strategy that Wittgenstein elaborated his grammatical
interpretation  of  the  relationships  of  internal-external  and  mind-body.  He  stated,
“‘Mental’ for me is not a metaphysical, but a logical epithet” (Wittgenstein 1992: 217).
17 I said previously that a good part of twentieth century thought tried to carry forward the
skepticism  expressed  by  British  empiricism  with  regard  to  all  the  ontological-
metaphysical vocabulary instituted by Descartes. And I would like now to recall briefly
two aspects of David Hume’s approach to the theme of personal identity, which have been
shown  to  give  a  particularly  lively  contribution  to  contemporary  reflection:  (1)  the
criterion of memory as a basic ingredient of self-knowledge and (2) the socio-biological
notion  of  the  human  subject.  Both  criteria  are  in  fact  focused  on  contesting  the
ontological-metaphysical opposition between ‘inner’ and ‘outer.’
18 Among the many contemporary variations of Hume’s point of view, those which favor the
field  of  language,  as  a  field  both  of  the  construction  and  of  the  communication  of
personal  identity,  are,  in  my  opinion,  particularly  consistent  with  pragmatism.  The
reference here is to the ‘narrative’ model of personal identity, i.e. a model that tends to
show,  although  in  very  differing  directions,  the  inextricable  interweaving  between
subjectivity and the socio-cultural environment of which language is the fundamental
structure. Thus, for example, in Paul Ricoeur the narrative model aims at recovering in an
ethical key some crucial motifs of the traditional notion of a spiritual substance of the
human being, whereas in the philosophy of the mind of Daniel C. Dennett (1991) this
model is, instead, an integral part of a materialistic reductionism that affects the whole of
the Cartesian vocabulary of subjectivity.
19 According to Dennett,  the biological  mechanisms of  self-protection are the authentic
thrust behind the “webs of discourses” that we constantly weave in order to “present
ourselves to others and to ourselves”; language is, in itself,  a biological function that
feeds itself, so that the identity that we attribute to ourselves is in reality the product, not
the source of the “narrative sequence,” of the “stories we tell others – and ourselves –
about who we are.” From this comes the definition of the self as the “narrative center of
gravity,” that  is,  the abstract,  nonexistent entity that  is  postulated for biological  and
social reasons, and which gives the same advantages that the notion of “gravitational
center”  has  in  physics  for  the  calculation  of  gravitational  forces.  Here  are  a  few
representative passages of Dennett’s argumentation:
Our human environment contains not just food and shelter, enemies to fight or flee,
and conspecifics with whom to mate, but words, words, words. These words are
potent  elements  of  our  environment  that  really  incorporate,  investigating  and
extruding  them,  weaving  them  like  spiderwebs  into  self-protective  strings  of
narrative. Indeed, when we let in these words, these meme-vehicles, they tend to
take over, creating us out of the raw materials they find in our brains.
Our fundamental  tactic  of  self-protection,  self-control,  and self-definition is  not
spinning  webs  or  building  dams,  but  telling  stories,  and  more  particularly
concocting and controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about who we
are. […] Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin them; they spin us.
Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their
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source.
These strings or streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source […]: their
effect on any audience is to encourage them to (tray to) posit a unified agent whose
words they are: in short, to posit a center of narrative gravity. Physics appreciate the
enormous simplification you get when you posit a center of gravity for an object, a
single point relative to which all gravitational forces may be calculated. We hetero-
phenomenologists appreciate the enormous simplification you get when you posit a
center  of  narrative  gravity  for  narrative-spinning  human  body. (Dennett  1991:
417-8)
20 The biological component of the narrative model of personal identity is quite important
in Richard Rorty’s point of view, as well. He also gave particular attention to the ethical-
social aspect of the question, connecting it to the value of solidarity. Here I will limit
myself to saying that Rorty maintains that self-knowledge amounts to a process of self-
description, which sets off a request for recognition on the part of others. To summarize
briefly, it is a question of favoring the nexus of language, social interaction and self-
awareness, showing that the choice of a certain vocabulary, of a certain way of speaking
with oneself and with others, is of a contingent nature, that is, tied to a cultural history
that is carried out by means of the gradual acquisition of new metaphors, to which new
cognitive and value criteria correspond. We thus touch on the concepts of final vocabulary
and of irony, which are two crucial aspects of the ‘ethnocentric’ point of view that Rorty
maintains in various contexts, above all beginning from the 1980s.7
21 Since the final vocabularies do not represent the presumed objectivity of facts, there is no
criterion for establishing a priori what the “truest” one is. But this does not mean to
negate the importance of a critical recognition of one’s own final vocabulary and of some
adjustments  to  it.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  question  of  placing  the  ethical  value  of
communication and of reciprocal knowledge in the foreground, as well as the ethical
value of irony, the constructive role that the ironic attitude can carry out in the processes
of self-realization and reciprocal recognition, setting this value as the basic condition of
the  possible  changes  to  a  final  vocabulary.  The  following  assertions  are  particularly
incisive:
I shall define “ironist” as someone who fulfils three conditions: (1) She has radical
and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she
has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or
books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present
vocabulary can neither  underwrite  nor dissolve these doubts;  (3)  insofar  as  she
philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer
to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. (Rorty 1989: 75)
22 Moreover:
For us ironists, nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save another
such vocabulary; there is no answer to a redescription save a re-re-redescription.
Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion of choice
between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not of
comparing both pictures with the original. Nothing can serve as a criticism of a
person save another person, or of a culture save an alternative culture –for persons
and cultures  are,  for  us,  incarnated vocabularies.  So  our  doubts  about  our  own
characters or our own culture can be resolved or assuaged only by enlarging our
acquaintance. (Rorty 1989: 82)
23 I  will  move towards my conclusion with a reference to the pragmatist  conception of
sociality  as  a  normative  criterion  –  both  epistemic  and  value-oriented  –  of  central
importance. In fact, it is precisely by means of this criterion that classical pragmatism
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tried to oppose the Cartesian principle of self-transparency, a principle which in any case
has been nearly cancelled by the criticisms of the notion of the authenticity of the self. As
is widely known, Marxian criticism to the ideological superstructure of human reality and
psychoanalysis  have  certainly  constituted  the  most  influential  passages  of  these
criticisms in all the fields of our culture. However, the return to a reflection on the notion
of authenticity,  using precisely the rich store of critical knowledge available to us,  is
perhaps a pathway that we should take in order to attempt to clarify the basic structure
of that relationship to one’s self through which, in concrete experience, one constructs
self-understanding and the image of oneself to offer to others. In order to illustrate this
possibility, I will use the analysis made by Charles Larmore, which will help to show that
the advisability  of  going beyond the Cartesian formulation of  the theme of  personal
identity is not necessarily equivalent to the dissolution of the subject. In particular, his
analysis will help to show that the level of normativity can be an integral part of an anti-
essentialist approach to the understanding of the human subject.
24 The thesis that emerges from the analysis carried out by Larmore (2004) is that “the self
relates to itself because it is engaged (s’engage),  and because it recognizes itself.” The
relationship with the self, which is constitutive of the self, is, to put it briefly, essentially
practical, a relationship in which nobody else can replace the self and which makes of this
self, as a consequence, the self that we alone have to be.
25 In other words, the structure of the self is normative, because normativity is that which,
according  to  Larmore,  constitutes  the  nature  of  all  mental  states  –  beliefs,  desires,
emotions,  feelings,  perceptions  (‘interpreted’  sensations).  The  essential  point  of
Larmore’s proposal is that subjective identity involves the processes of reflection, both
cognitive and practical: both those regarding the knowledge of the world and of oneself,
and those that consist in taking responsibility for one’s beliefs, actions, and affectivity.
26 It is a thesis that passes, on the one hand, through the examination of the concept of
authenticity (in its present meaning of “being fully or purely oneself, that is, behaving in
a way according to which the self that we are shows itself without deformations and
according to its intrinsic value”), and on the other hand, through the examination of the
phenomenon of social mimetism.
27 One can agree with Larmore that a fruitful recovery of the notion of authenticity pre-
supposes its detachment from the idea that it should be a supreme value, a value that
would  have  to  surpass  all  the  others.  This  is,  in  fact,  a  presupposition  due  to  the
“philosophical mania” for placing everything in a hierarchical order, whereas, instead,
the ethical horizon, or rather, the ethical order has a pluralistic structure, an internal logic
according to which a value is no less fundamental or less real if at times one admits the
necessity to sacrifice it in order to pursue others. It is necessary to re-examine in this
sense the notions of authenticity of the self and of sincerity, but this implies, of course,
also going beyond the idea of a pre-existing and pre-ordained structure of the self. The
project of authenticity and of sincerity, as opposed to the need to conform to the opinions
of others (to what Stendhal calls ‘vanity’), is bound to fail precisely because it includes
cognitive reflection, which is necessarily tied to the principle of engagement with others:
both an ‘other’ who is real or imaginary, and a Generalized Other, an expression coined by
George Herbert Mead to indicate a point of view that can be shared intersubjectively and
is thus extended towards universality. In a few words, cognitive reflection “can never
reach  the  point  of  indifference  towards  others,”  which  instead  is  presupposed  by
Stendhal’s project of authenticity.8
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28 The  ideal  of  authenticity  is  thus  an  illusion  precisely  because  it  relies  on  the
presupposition that, in order to be natural and fully oneself, it is necessary to escape from
what the influence of others has made us. But the concept of authenticity can be restored
in the light of the distinction between “an action modeled on a convention and action
originating from a habit created by the convention.”
29 Mimetism, the necessity to conform to the point of view of another person, can take on
an abstract form, that is, be addressed to objective norms and imply the tending towards
universality that supports our normal inclination to find a reason to believe or to do
something. Bringing into being our inclination to conform to other imaginary or real
individuals amounts, concretely, to having a reason to do it, and this, in its turn, consists in
the fact that we attribute value-authority to the model to which we intend to conform.
30 The reference to others constitutes a reason, that is, a normative principle of cognitive
reflection,  both  as  regards  the  knowledge  of  external  things  and  as  regards  the
knowledge  of  oneself,  of  one’s  identity.  To  accept  a  belief  or  carry  out  an  action
‘reflexively’ means to have reasons to do it, to engage oneself in these reasons, and thus to
assume the responsibility for everything that these engagements imply.
31 Reasons,  engagements,  responsibilities are terms that belong to the field of cognitive
reflection as well as to that of practical reflection, two fields that thus seem inseparable,
dialectically interwoven in the concreteness of human experience. And it is important to
emphasize that to give value to alterity as a leading factor in the ability to reflect and to
find ‘reasons’ to support our knowledge, feelings and behaviors, means also to oppose the
consequences  implied  by  the  external/internal  dichotomy  in  human  relations.
Specifically,  it  means  to  oppose  making  this  dichotomy  concrete  in  the  solipsistic
philosophical attitude as well as in the ordinary and strongly rooted conviction that ‘true’
knowledge in itself is an exclusive prerogative of the subject, that the access to the so-
called sphere of the mental or of the so-called ‘inner world’ is necessarily private, as a
matter of fact always precluded from comprehension by others. This is important since
under this view each person is destined in the end to an insuperable distance from others
in reasoning as well as in desiring and in detesting, in experiencing joy and suffering, in
planning and in hoping. Twentieth century philosophy offered numerous conceptual and
methodological strategies for putting aside solipsism, strategies which were of course of
different sorts (one can think, for example, of the difference between the anti-solipsism
of Wittgenstein and that of Husserl). In any case these tools coincide substantially with
the assertion by Larmore of the ethical value that the ‘public’ dimension has in the course
of the human subject’s cognitive and value-related practices. This is an aspect that runs
through all the annotations I have proposed here as a central theme, an aspect that I
would like to emphasize with these words by Larmore:
There  is  no  type  of  exceptional  knowledge,  either  from  observation  or  from
inference, which is available only to us, regarding our beliefs or our desires and
which would grant an authority to us which nobody else could claim. It is exactly
the  opposite,  and  everything  that  we  know  about  ourselves  is  founded  on  the
radically public procedures that are observation and inference.
The ‘interiority’ of the self, if one wants at all costs to preserve the term, does not
really mean anything more than the fact that we alone, and nobody else in our
place,  are  able  to  engage  ourselves.  […]  To  put  it  briefly,  the  relationship  with
oneself that makes each of us a self is neither paradoxical nor mysterious […], because
it is a question of that fundamentally practical relationship, engagement. […] It is
only  because  in  our  beliefs  and  our  desires  we  take  positions  and  we  engage
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ourselves to respect their implications that we become objects of knowledge, even
for ourselves. (Larmore 2004: 159-60; my translation from French)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CALCATERRA R. M., (1993), “Wittgenstein e Peirce sull’esperienza interna,” Paradigmi XI, 327-51.
CALCATERRA R. M., (2003), “Lo spazio normativo dei sentimenti,” in Calcaterra R. M., Pragmatismo: i
valori dell’esperienza. Letture di Peirce, James e Mead, Roma, Carocci.
COLAPIETRO V., (1989), Peirce’s Approach to the Self. A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity,
Albany, SUNY Press.
DE TIENNE A., (2005), “La persona come segno,” in Calcaterra R. M. (ed.), Semiotica e fenomenologia
del sé, Torino, Aragno.
DENNET D. C., (1991), Consciousness Explained, New York-Boston-London, Little, Brown &Co.
LARMORE C., (2004), Les pratiques du moi, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. English
translation, (2010), Practices of the Self, Chicago, University Press of Chicago.
PEIRCE C. S., (1898), “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,” in Ketner K. L. (ed.), 1992, Reasoning and
the Logic of Things. The Cambridge Conferences of 1898, Cambridge (Ma), Harvard University Press.
RESHER N., (1995), “Peirce on the Validation of Science,” in Ketner K. L. (ed.), 1995, Peirce and
Contemporary Thought. Philosophical Inquiries, New York, Fordham University Press.
RORTY R., (1989), Contingency, Irony and Solidariety, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
RORTY R. & A. N. BASLEV, (1991), Cultural Otherness. Correspondence with Richard Rorty, London,
Indian Institute of Advanced Studies.
WITTGENSTEIN L., (1969), On Certainty, Oxford, Blackwell.
WITTGENSTEIN L., (1992), Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II, The Inner and the Outer,
1949-51, Oxford, Blackwell.
NOTES
1. Important reconstructions of Peirce’s conception of subjectivity are Colapietro (1989) and De
Tienne (2005: 91-100).
2. I tried to develop this interpretation in Calcaterra 2003.
3. See Resher 1995.
4. Peirce maintains that the true scientific investigator should “stand aloof from all intent to
make practical applications,” since this intent would not only “obstruct the advance of the pure
science” but also would “danger his own moral integrity and that of his readers.”
5. Cf. Wittgenstein 1969.
6. A more detailed discussion of this argument can be found in Calcaterra 1993, in which I also
compare Wittgenstein’s and Peirce’s approaches to the relationship inner/outer.
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7. Rorty 1989, especially I and II Part. See also R. Rorty & A. N. Baslev 1991.
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